Innovation contests and crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing platforms such as InnoCentive and Topcoder let organizations, including Siemens, Pfizer and NASA, run contests in which diverse solvers propose solutions to complex problems. Governments also use them to tackle societal challenges. I have studied these contests since 2009, when operations research on the topic was sparse.
My papers address how to reward solvers, how many to admit given their skill diversity and the problem’s complexity, how long a contest should run, and whether to run contests in parallel. A book chapter in Sharing Economy: Making Supply Meet Demand (Springer) gives a general framework. Recent work, with my PhD students and co-authors, uses laboratory experiments to study how capacity-constrained solvers behave and how platform rules, such as participation limits, affect effort and contest choice.
Optimal award scheme Impact of solver heterogeneity Restricted or free entry Optimal duration Parallel contests A general framework for contests How do capacitated solvers behave on crowdsourcing platforms? Should solvers focus their effort on a contest in crowdsourcing platforms?